Farrell Trinity College Dublin S. Boeyen Entrust R. Housley Vigil Security W. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" STD 1 for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Abstract This memo profiles the X.
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Farrell Trinity College Dublin S. Boeyen Entrust R. Housley Vigil Security W. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" STD 1 for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Abstract This memo profiles the X. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction.
The X. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. An algorithm for X. An ASN. Cooper, et al. Freshest CRL a. Private Internet Extensions Authority Information Access Subject Information Access CRL Fields CertificateList Fields Certificate List "To Be Signed" Issuer Name This Update Next Update Revoked Certificates CRL Extensions Authority Key Identifier Issuer Alternative Name CRL Number Delta CRL Indicator Issuing Distribution Point CRL Entry Extensions Reason Code Invalidity Date Certificate Issuer Certification Path Validation Basic Path Validation Basic Certificate Processing Wrap-Up Procedure Using the Path Validation Algorithm CRL Validation Revocation Inputs Initialization and Revocation State Variables CRL Processing Processing Rules for Internationalized Names Internationalized Names in Distinguished Names Internationalized Domain Names in GeneralName Internationalized Domain Names in Distinguished Names Internationalized Resource Identifiers Internationalized Electronic Mail Addresses Security Considerations IANA Considerations Normative References Informative References Explicitly Tagged Module, Syntax Implicitly Tagged Module, Syntax Certificate Revocation List Introduction This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.
Procedures are described for processing of certification paths in the Internet environment. Finally, ASN. Section 2 describes Internet PKI requirements and the assumptions that affect the scope of this document.
Section 4 profiles the X. Section 6 includes certification path validation procedures. Implementations of this specification are not required to use any particular cryptographic algorithms. Finally, three appendices are provided to aid implementers. Appendix A contains all ASN.
As above, the material is presented in the ASN. Appendix B contains notes on less familiar features of the ASN. Appendix C contains examples of conforming certificates and a conforming CRL. This specification obsoletes [ RFC ]. Where in use by an established PKI, transition to UTF8String could cause denial of service based on name chaining failures or incorrect processing of name constraints. RFC required that the policy mappings extension be marked as non-critical.
RFC permitted the policy constraints extension to be marked as critical or non-critical. In RFC , this information was returned to a relying party.
The ASN. Requirements and Assumptions The goal of this specification is to develop a profile to facilitate the use of X. In order to relieve some of the obstacles to using X. Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that Cooper, et al.
A certificate user should review the certificate policy generated by the certification authority CA before relying on the authentication or non-repudiation services associated with the public key in a particular certificate. To this end, this standard does not prescribe legally binding rules or duties.
As supplemental authorization and attribute management tools emerge, such as attribute certificates, it may be appropriate to limit the authenticated attributes that are included in a certificate. These other management tools may provide more appropriate methods of conveying many authenticated attributes. Communication and Topology The users of certificates will operate in a wide range of environments with respect to their communication topology, especially users of secure electronic mail.
This profile supports users without high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connection availability. In addition, the profile allows for the presence of firewall or other filtered communication.
This profile does not assume the deployment of an X. The profile does not prohibit the use of an X. Acceptability Criteria The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure PKI is to meet the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication, access control, and authorization functions.
Support for these services determines the attributes contained in the certificate as well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as policy data and certification path constraints.
User Expectations Users of the Internet PKI are people and processes who use client software and are the subjects named in certificates. This profile recognizes the limitations of the platforms these users Cooper, et al. This manifests itself in minimal user configuration responsibility e. Providing administrators with unbounded choices increases the chances that a subtle CA administrator mistake will result in broad compromise.
Also, unbounded choices greatly complicate the software that process and validate the certificates created by the CA. Overview of Approach Following is a simplified view of the architectural model assumed by the Public-Key Infrastructure using X. CAs are responsible for indicating the revocation status of the certificates that they issue.
PKI Entities 3. This confidence is obtained through the use of public key certificates, which are data structures that bind public key values to subjects. The binding is asserted by having a trusted CA digitally sign each certificate.
Modernizing email and calendars for users and developers
These certificates are in X. This is iwtf example of a decoded X. Any explicit references within that referenced document should also be listed: Most of them are arcs from the joint-iso-ccitt 2 ds 5 id-ce 29 OID. This allows that old user certificates such as cert5 and uetf certificates such as cert6 can be trusted indifferently by a party having either the new root CA certificate or the old one as trust anchor during the transition to the new CA keys. Since the certificate is needed to verify signed data, it is possible to include them in the SignedData structure. This will enable the domain name system to function over certain paths where existing In general, if a certificate has several extensions restricting its use, all restrictions must be satisfied for a given use to be appropriate. Current information, if any, about IPR issues:.
IETF RFC 5280
Google Network Working Group D. Farrell Trinity College Dublin S. Boeyen Entrust R. Housley Vigil Security W. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" STD 1 for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
IETF RFC 5280 PDF